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Government economic policies typically undervalue prices of agri-
cultural products in low income countries (Bale and Lutz). The primary
reason for this has been to keep _rices of food and materials low to
promote industrialization. Input price subsidies, public expenditures
on irrigation, investments in research and extension, and concessionary
credit policies are frequently used to offset adverse effects of price
policies on production incentives in agriculture.
The credit policies and programs have stressed the expansion of
the volume of agricultural loans from institutional sources at low
interest rates, and have often been accompanied by supervision and
input price subsidies. The underlying premise is that informal sources
of funds carry high interest rates that hinder expansion of agricultural
output. Officials who favor these credit policies have shown little
concern for the negative effects of such policies on the ability of
rural financial markets toperform efficiently. They have also ignored .
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2the fact that these policies usually result in more inequitable loan
distribution. (Gonzalee-Ve_a)
The performance of credit programs has usually been measured in
terms of their impact on agricultural production, investment, and
adoption of new technology. A recent evaluation of existing credit
research, however, emphasized the serious methodological problems
involved (David and Meyer). It was concluded that most micro credit
impact studies are descriptive, and are more useful in generating
hypotheses than in rigorously measuring loan impact. Only a few studies
use econometric and mathematical programming techniques and they gene-
rally suffer from conceptual problems arising from the interdependence
of production and consumption decision of farm-households, the fungi-
bility of credit, and non-price credit rationing by lenders.
Aggregate credit impact studies also have similar methodological
problems, but empirical results are more consistent in showing that
little impact on production, investment, and proportion of loans
granted to agriculture can be attributed to credit programs and
policies (Herdt and Gonzales). These results should not be surprising
because technology and relative prices across commodities and between
inputs and outputs are much more important determinants of relative
profitability and, hence, direction of resource flows.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how credit Dolicies in
the Philippines are related to economic incentives in agriculture and
to analyze the eltemt to which cheap credit is am effective w_y to
3offset various taxes on agriculture. The first section describes the
policies affecting growth of the formal agricultural credit system.
The second section presents estimates of the effects of government
policies on the relative prices of agricultural products. The third
section argues that low interest rates do not alter the incentive
structure facing agriculture nor rosolve equity problems caused by
price policies.
Agricultural Credit Policies
Credit has been a major agricultural development instrument in the
Philippines. In the early fifties, the Rural Bank Law was passed to
promote rural private banks and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Farmer's Association (ACCFA) was also established to promote cooperative
financial institutions catering especially to the rural sector. There
are currently more than a thousand rural banks operating in about 60
per cent of municipalities. They have become the principal distributors
of government-mponsored supervised credit. The ACCFA was supposed to
develop farm cooperatives, providing production and marketing credit,
but because of serious default problems, it was reorganized and renamed
the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). It now administers a
small supervised credit program for land reform beneficiaries.
The government's objective of increasing the credit flow to agri-
culture has been hampered by low interest rates policies. Up until the
1981 interest rate reform, interest rates and other financial charges
have been regulated by the Monetary Board to conform with the 16 per
4cent ceiling stipulated by the Usury Law of 1916. During the past
decade, allowable interest rates of formal agricultural credit ranged
from 12 to 16 percent and additional loan charges from 2 to 3 percent
depending on the security and other terms of the loans. Supervised
credit bears a lower interest rate of I0 percent with additional charges
not exceeding 3 percent. For rural savings deposits, the interest
rates were about 6 percent but higher for time deposits.
Since the late sixties, official interest rates on agricultural
credit have been lower than the scarcity price of loanable funds, with
negative consequence on the rate of savings, investments in agriculture,
and factor intensities (International Labor Organization). Because of
rapid inflation (around 20 percent during the 1970's), interest rates
were negative in real terms. This price structure rewarded borrowers
and penalized savers. This also created excess loan demand that limited
the flow of loans to agriculture_ especially to small farmers, where
costs of transactions and risks for lenders were inherently higher.
To increase agricultural credit, the government required a certain
proportion of lenders' portfolios of loans go to credit for agriculture
and initiated a number of supervised agricultural credit programs. In
1974, the Monetary Board directed all lending institutions to allocate
25 percent of their loanable funds to agriculture and at least I0 per
cent of total to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Private commercial
banks, however, have strongly resisted this rule and have simply
purchased certificates of indebtedness and other government securities
5issued by the Central Bank to comply with the regulation because of
the high cost of directly lending to farmers.
Table i lists the various special agricultural credit programs
(SCPs) and their corresponding total loans granted during the period
1973-1980. Most of these programs linked low interest, non-collateral
loans with extension. Between 1973 and 1975, these were also tied to a
fertilizer price subsidy. Financial institutions were provided preferen-
tial rediscount rates, loan guarantees, and assistance in loan adminis-
tration under these programs. These were financed, in part, by foreign
loans.
A major rice production promotion program, Masagana 99, accounted
for almost 80 percent of total loans granted by SCPs. Since the initial
objective of Masagana 99 was to recover from serious crop losses in 1973,
priority was given to irrigated areas where the potential for rapid
expansion of rice production in the short-run was greatest. Programs
after Masagana 99, although much smaller in scale, attempted to extend
supervised credit to non-rice, rainfed areas.
Problems associated with these programs and policies are now well-
documented (David). Over the past two decades, growth in agricultural
loans came mainly from the Central Bank rediscount window rather than
from additional equity capital or savings deposits. This is evidenced
by the increase in the share of borrowings from the Central Bank in
total resources of rural banks from 8 percent in 1961 to 54 percent in
1975. Low repayment rates, which have plagued almost all supervised
6Table I. Supervised Agricultural Credit Programs in the
Philippines from 1973 to 1980.
Loans Granted _/
Program Commodity (_ million)
I. Masagana 99 Rice 4,554
2. Masaganang Maisan and
Masagana 77 Corn 521
3. Gulayan sa Kalusugan Vegetables 22
4. Cotton Financing Progress Cotton 71
5. Integrated Agricultural
Financi_ for Virginia
Tobacco =' Tobacco 34
6. Rice-Tobacco Supervised
Credit Program Tobacco 3
7. Philippine Tobacco Administration
(PTA) Farm Credit Assist. Program Tobacco 3
8. PTA Facility Loans Tobacco 1
9. Bakahang Barangay Cattle 256
I0. Biyayang Dagat Fish 35
Total _5,500
_/As of December 31, 1980.
_/As of 1979.
Source: Unpublished files. Technical Board of Agricultural
Credit_ Central Bank of the Philippines.
7credit programs, threatened the viability of rural credit institutions,
and further damaged credit discipline among borrowers. The impact of
these programs on production at the farm level as well as at an aggregate
level has remained unclear. While the Masagana 99 helped the rapid
recovery of Philippine rice production from the global food grain crisis
in 1973, the growth trend in rice production and adoption of the new
rice technology since the late sixties cannot be attributed to Masagana 99
(Herdt and Gonzales).
Despite these government interventions, Table 2 indicates that the
real and relative levels of agricultural production loans (APL) granted
have declined since the late 1960's. APL grew in real terms but most
of this growth took place in the 1960'e. The level of APL in 1979 was
still far below that in 1969. APL as a percent of net value added in
agriculture and total loans granted declined from 22 percent and 20
percent in 1955-1969 to 19 percent and II percent, resplctively, in
the 1970's.
These trends are perhaps not surprising since technology and
relative prices across sectors, commodities, and between inputs and
outputs are more important determinants of relative profitability and
hence direction of resource allocation. Larson and Vogel and others
have already argued that the use of credit Policies tO compensate for
the effects of policies that turn terms of trade against food and
agricultural exports will have limited effects. It is too often
overlooked that preferential interest rates do not affect relative
8Table 2. Selected Indicators of Trends in Loans Granted for
Agricultural Production by Bank and Non-Bank
Financial Institutions, 1951-1979.
Value of
Agricultural Loans_ / Asricultural Loans as a Percent of
Year (_ Million in Agricultural Total Loans
1979 Prices) Value Added Granted_/
1951 376 13 40
1955 534 17 24
1960 2,757 14 20
1961 3,636 19 22
1962 4,022 21 20
1963 4,461 24 20
1964 4,503 25 19
1965 4,420 23 19
1966 4,582 24 19
1967 5,556 27 20
1968 5,665 25 16
1969 5,794 22 16
1970 4,557 22 15
1971 3,943 21 13
1972 3,424 20 12
1973 2,590 19 I0
1974 1,725 22 12
1975 1,718 21 09
1976 982 13 -
1977 1,096 06 08
1978 2,534 13 -
1979 3,378 19 -
h/Refers to loans granted for agricultural production only.
_/For later years, data on total loans granted have not been
reported.
Sources: Unpublished reports by the Technical Board of
Agricultural Credit, Centr_l Bank of the Philippines,
and the National Economic and Development Authority.
9profitability. And because credit is fungible, additional liquidity
supplied by credit will be allocated to the most profitable enterprise
or to consumption, whichever provides the greatest utility.
Price Intervention Policies
The effects of government policies on economic incentives in agri-
culture have not received adequate attention in the Philippines. The
fact that small farmers are rational and price-responsive has been amply
demonstrated by researchers elsewhere. Price relationships among crops,
between agriculture and non-agriculture, between product and input prices
have been shown to have important consequences on resource allocation as
well as on income distribution. In the Philippines, these price
relations have been influenced by interventions intended to achieve
several, often conflicting objectives: food self-sufficiency, low food
prices, stable prices, higher farm income, more government revenues,
and increased processing of agricultural products. In addition, price
controls, export taxes, trade quotas, import tariffs, nationalization
of marketing_ and the general overvaluation of domestic currency have
been important policies affecting relative prices especially during the
past decade. Domestic prices have also been influenced by policies of
other countries such as the US sugar quota policy prior to the 1970's
and the US PL 480 program.
The impact of economic policies on agricultural incentives can be
measured by the nominal protection rates (NPR) and implicit tariffs (IT).
Both NPR's and IT's measure the percentage difference between domestic
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price and border price of products and inputs, respectively. _/ Border
prices (usually defined as CIF import price for importables or FOB
export prices for exportables)converted at official exchange rates are
used as bases of comparison because they represent opportunity costs of
commodities that enter trade. When border price is converted at the
official exchange rates, as in NPR or IT, the difference between domestic
and border price is attributed to government price interventions such as
trade, fiscal, and price policies. On the other hand, by converting
border price by the shadow exchange rate, a measure of net nominal
protection rate, which takes into account all government policies,
including the general overvaluation of the exchange rate defended by
the protection system, is obtained.
Table 3 presents average NPR's for the Philippines by major commo-
dity groups for two time periods to highlight the impact of increasing
government regulation of the agricultural sector. _/ While government
intervention in the later period was part of the overall attempts to
balamce economic growth, many policies were instituted to cushion the
impact on consumer prices of the floating of exchange rates in 1970
m u
i/ Pd Pd
NPR _ Pb i x 100; IT = Pb I x i00; where P denotes border
U m
price, Pd = price paid by the user, and Pd = price received by domestic
producers and importers. Prices are defined at a comparable point in
the marketing chain to insure that differences between domestic and border
pzices are due to government interventions rather than to real costs.
_/Annual differences in nominal protection rates were not shown
because they would, in general, be related to price fluctuations rather
than to policy changes.
II
Table 3. Nominal Protection Rates in Philippine Agriculture,
1955-1980.
Proportion Nominal Proportion Nominal
of Value Protection of Value Protection
Added Rate (%) Added Rate (%)
Food Crops
Rice .27 4 .25 -7
Corn .09 2 .08 I
Other Crops ,13 0 .18 0
Export Crops
Sugar .09 60 .09 -23
Copra .09 -8 .08 -22
Other Exports .09 0 .12 - 4
Livestock and Poultry
Livestock .17 28 .13 4
Poultry .07 77 ,07 48
Average (Total) (I.00) 15 (1.00) -2
e
12
and the oil and food grain crises in 1973.
Import Competing Food Crops
Among the domestically marketed food crops, the food staples, rice
and corn, have historically been theobjects of direct Drice interven-
tions. Prices of other food crops such as vegetables, fruits, nuts,
roots, and tubers were less controlled except potentially by the tariff
structure, l/ Domestic prices of rice and corn have been generally close
to border prices. In the 1970's, domestic rice price was below the
border price by 7 percent. In part, this was due to the price inter-
ventions in 1973-1975 when world prices of rice and fertilizer rose
fourfold because of the oil crisis and world-wide grain shortages.
The National Food Authority (NFA) is responsible for regulating
food grain prices to achieve low prices for consumers and adequate price
incentives for producers. It buys grains in the domestic market to
defend a farm floor price, but the amount of imports or exports which
are under government monopoly is the main determinant of grain prices.
Previous studies had noted that the provision of stable and low rice
prices for urban consumers tended to dominate the objective of supporting
farm price to raise incomes of small farmers (}_ngahas). This was
!/Tariff protection is redundant for exportable crops and does not
apply to food grains where only the govermment can import or export. It
should also be noted that tariffs are expected to be effective in raising
domestic price over border prices only in potentially import competing
products. Since most of the agricultural commodities are either subjected
to quantitative trade restrictions or are not significantly tFaded, price
comparisons have been used to measure NPR instead of legal tariff rates.
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achieved through imports during years of production shortfalls. After
1975, the domestic rice prices became internationally competitive° Some
commercial rice exports have occurred since 1978 as a result of the new
rice technology and irrigation expansion. Price policy for corn, an
important upland crop and the staple food for about 20 percent of the
population, also has the same bias. Moreover, the policy of keeping the
price of meat low for urban consumers is another reason for maintaining
a relatively low price of corn.
Export Crops
Growing regulation of agriculture in the 1970's has been significant
in the export sector. Prior to 1970_ the Bovernment rarely intervened
in the production and trade of export crops except indirectly through
the overvaluation of exchange rates and other regulations relating to
foreign exchange. However, in the case of sugar, export quotas that
limited exports to 60 percent of production were instituted in 1962 to
protect domestic consumers from the increased access of Philippine
producers to the highly protected U.So sugar market. Despite this, the
incentive effect of the UoS. sugar quota policy that provided an export
price much higher than world prices from 1955 to 1969 resulted in a
high nominal protection rate of 60 percent on domestic sugar production.
During the 1970's, government policies generally reduced domestic
prices of export crops below those that would have prevailed under the
previous policy regime. Since the floating of the exchange rate in
1970, many agricultural crop exports have been penalized by export taxes
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ranging from 4 to 6 percent. The rate of 6 percent is levied on
traditional exports of copra and centrifugal sugar to promote higher
degrees of processing of agricultural exports. Other export crops
subject to a 4 percent export tax are processed coconut products,
molasses, abaca, bananas, and tobacco° Between 1973 and 1975, additional
export premium duties were temporarily levied to siphon off part of
the gains from higher world prises. These export taxes were initially
imposed as stabilization measures, but they have been continued as a
tax on agriculture,
In the case of sugar and copra, the penalty or implicit tax on
producers rose to more than 20 percent due to new regulations in these
industries. Since 1970, sugar trading has effectively been nationalized,
first under the Philippine Exchange, Inc., and currently under the
National Sugar Trading Corp., which has become the sole wholesale buyer
and seller of sugar in both domestic and international markets.
Producers are paid a composite price that theoretically is a weighted
average of export price, domestic wholesale price, and domestic reserve
price. However, as in the quota system, this arrangement has served
to lower the domestic price significantly below export prices thereby
transferring income from domestic producers to domestic consumers.
Two taxes called the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Fund (CCSF)
and the Coconut Investment Fund (Cocofund) have been imposed on the
coconut industry since 1973o The tax rates have changed over time,
typically rising and falling with the world price of copra. In some
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years, the CCSF levy in ad valorem terms represented a tax of about
20 percent of border price. Although the tax is collected at the
miller's level, the incidence of the tax is clearly at the farm level.
About 20 percent of the revenues from the tax supports the
direct subsidy on domestic consumption of coconut oil products. The
remainder is supposed to finance development programs in the coconut
industry such as replanting, vertical integration, and scholarships.
Research, to date, shows that only a small segment of the coconut
industry actually receives the benefits from these programs (David, 1977).
On the other hand, the gains from the replanting program are uncertain.
It is not known how well hybrid seeds will perform under diverse
Philippine conditions. Furthermore, small coconut farmers with no
alternative source of income have been hesitant to face the prospect
of waiting for three years to harvest a first crop. At least for the
short run, the CCSF and Cocofund levies may be considered a tax on the
industry.
Livestock and Poultr_r
The incentive structure for livestock appears to offer lower
rewards than for poultry, but both are more favored than the crop
sector. However, the general trend of declining incentives over time
because of government policy also seems to have occurred. Domestic
prices of livestock, specifically pork, and poultry were 28 percent
and 77 percent higher than their corresponding border prices prior to
the 1970's and slightly higher than those predicted by their tariff
16
rates,i/ In the 1970's, percentage price difference declined to levels
somewhat lower than the legal tariff rates of I0 percent for livestock
and 70 percent for poultry. This may be due to price controls imposed
on those products which were accompanied also by price controls on mixed
feeds and feedgrains, higher imports of corn, and other feedgrains to
provide a reasonable margin for producers during this period.
Protection of Agriculture and Manufacturing
The direction and rate of resource flows between agriculture and
non-agriculture are not only influenced by the nominal rate of protection
on product prices; they also depend on the effects of policies on agri-
cultural input prices and on the nature of incentives in the non-
agricultural sector. The effective protection rate (EPR) measures the
percentage difference between value added at domestic prices and value
added at border prices. It takes the impact of price interventions on
inputs into account. Since estimates of EPR for agriculture are not
available, Table 4 compares the nominal protection rate in agriculture
to the implicit tariffs paid by farmers for agricultural inputs and to
EPR for manufacturing as estimated by Tan.z/
_/Since international trade in livestock and poultry has been
minimal and confined mainly to imports of breeding animals, special
cuts of meat for restantants or of fats for the meat processing
industry and their border prices were represented by the average CIF
import unit values in Hongkong.
_/NPR's in agriculture are not expected to be substantially
different from their EPR's because the proportion of intermediate
inputs to value added remains relatively small in Philippine agriculture.
Moreover_ one can expect EPR's to be lower than NPR's because of higher
protection on agricultural inputS.
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As can be noted, government policies have created an incentive
structure that is significantly biased against agriculture° While value
added in manufacturing has been artificially raised by 44 percent,
price intervention policies undervalued agricultural oroduction during
the last decade through lower product prices and higher input prices.
Because low food Drices tend to dominate the objective of agricul-
tural product price policy, it was expected that government interventions
in the agricultural input markets will try to offset this. However, it
is only in the case of Bravity irrigation, and formal rural credit, as
will be discussed later, where there appears to be some government
subsidy to producers° Implicit tariffs for agricultural chemicals,
agricultural machineries, and feed mixes ranging from 24 to 46 percent
reduce the effective protection in agriculture as a result of the
structure of legal tariffs and indirect sales tax. Despite price
controls and direct subsidies on fertilizer, there is still a positive
implicit tariff for fertilizer° It appears that the protection of
domestic manufacturing of these agricultural inputs, which is also
indicated by the level of implicit tariffs or IT{but is actually
significantly higher fer fertilizer because of direct subsidies), has
been an important consideration of policy.
The overall magnitude of the bias against agriculture is reflected
by the measure of net protection rates that includes the impact of the
overvaluation of the exchange rate due to the protection system. Although
the exchange rate has been allowed to float since 1970, the structure of
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Table 4. Comparison of Protection Rates in Agriculture and
D_nufacturing Sector, 1970Vs.
Agriculture (Nominal Protection Rates) - 2
(Net Nominal Protection Rate) -37
Agricultural Inputs (Implicit Tariffs)
Fertilizer _/ i0
Agricultural Chemicals _/ 28
Hand Tractors--b/ 46
Four-wheel Tractors _b/ 24
Irrigation Pump_b/ 46
Irri_ation Gravity (NIA system) _/ -55
Mixed Feeds--b/ 33
Manufacturing _d/ (Effective Protection Rate) 44
(Net Effective Protection Rate) 9
_/Based on price comparison of urea, ammonium sulphate, mixed
fertilizer and phosphates from 1973-1980.
_/Based on legal tariff rate and sales tax.
_/Based on comparison of NIA irrigation fee and estimates of
annualized cost of irrigation system by Moya, P.F., L. Small, and
S. Bhuiyan, "Cost of Different Types of Irrigation System in Central
Luzon," Department Paper No. 80-10, Dept. of A_Zlcultural Economics,
IRRI, June 1980.
_/Based on estimates by Tan, N. "The Structure of Protection and
Resource Flows in the Philippines," in Bautista, R., and J. Power,
Industrial Promotion Policies in the Philippines, Philippine Institute
for Development Studies, 1979.
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tariffs and other trade restrictions has reduced demand for imports and
thus increased the value of domestic currency. For the mid-1970's,
Medalla estimated that the tariff and tax system resulted in a 32 per
cent overvaluation of the pesos relative to a balanced free trade
situation, z/ If this is taken into consideration, penalties to agri-
culture net of the disincentive effect of an overvalued currency would
be even more severe (-37 percent) while manufacturing still receives
a 9 percent net effective protection rate. As a consequence of this
general pricing policy, agricultural production is less than what it
should be, and for certain commodities such as coconut products and
sugar, the level of domestic consumption may be somewhat higher than would
be expected with no price intervention. The fact that agriculture
survives and indeed grows suggests an inherent comparative advantage.
Impact of Credit Policies
To compare the quantitative impact of credit policies to price
policies, the effective subsidy rate (ESR) which expresses the amount
of interest rate subsidy as a percent of net value added in agriculture
at border prices has been estimated. Subsidy is defined in terms of the
difference in the cost of borrowing between agricultural and non-
agricultural loans multiplied by the value of agricultural loans granted.
Another method is to estimate the amount of subsidy accruing to the
Z/The situation since the mid-1970's has been one of chrolic and
growing deficits in current accounts, financed by heavy foreign borrowing.
This indicates an even higher percentage of peso overvaluation than that
protected by the tariff and tax system alone.
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sector due to the difference between the nominal interest rate and the
rate of inflation.
Differences in interest rates between agricultural and non-
agricultural loans from _ormsl financial institutions are small, at
most, 2 percent. Moreover, interest represents only part of the costs
of borrowing. Typically, non-agricultural loans entail less transaction
cost than agricultural loans for borrowers.
Assuming that interest rate policy has meant a cost of borrowing
differential of 6 percent in favor of agriculture, the effective subsidy
rate amounts to only I percent. Even if interest rate differential is
increased two or three times in magnitude, it is clear that the interest
rate subsidy will not alter significantly the unfavorable incentive
structure in agriculture vis-a-vis non-agriculture created by price
policies. On the other hand, low interest rate policy seriously impairs
the ability of rural financial markets to efficiently perform the
financial intermediation process. It does not provide incentives for
mobilizing financial savings and it induces an allocation of credit
that is based on size of collateral and wealth rather than productivity
of credit use.
The impact of the low interest rate policy on income
distribution tends to be regressive. The implicit subsidy
is shouldered by the lower income population, i.e., holders
of currency, bank deposits, and tax payers through inflation,
low interest rates on savings, and direct government outlay.
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Only about I0 percent of the total implicit interest rate subsidy is
received by agriculture. Within agriculture, credit allocation is also
not consistent with employment and equity objectives. Low cost credit
for agricultural machinery shifts the incentive system against use of
labor without significant impact on yield. Less than 15 percent of
the value of loans in the World Bank Credit Mechanization Program in the
Philippines was used for power tillers of small farmers. Four-wheel
tractors and other larger farm equipment were purchased with the bulk
of the loans by sugar farmers with 50 hectares or more who constituted
less than I0 percent of total number of farmers.
In supervised credit programs, only farm operators are usually
entitled to institutional credit despite the significant n_mber of
landless households in the rural areas. Rice has been the emphasis but
rice farmers are actually better off than average farmers in corn,
coconut, tobacco, and other crops. Within the rice sector, priority
was given to irrigated areas close to primary markets, i.e., relatively
progressive locations with the greatest potential for rapid increases
in production in the short-run. The procedure of setting loan limits
on a per hectare basis means a higher credit ceiling for larger farms.
Perhaps an even more important dimension of inequity in distribution
of the implicit subsidies involved in these programs was reported by
Esguerra in a recent analysis of Masegana 99. The study estimated that
two-thirds of the implicit subsidies have been received 5y participating
financial institutions as incentives to lend to small farmers and only
one-third by the farmer borrowers mainly from non-repayment of loans.
Z2
Furthermore, the distribution of the subsidies accruing to farmer
borrowers has been biased in favor of larger farmers. The subsidy to
farmers can be increased through higher default rates but this would
simply transform supervised credit into a costly vehicle for effecting
income transfers.
The common belief that extension would be more effective if tied
with low cost credit and vice versa is not clearly borne out by empirical
evidence. In the case of rice9 the modern varieties introduced in 1967
were already adopted by 67 percent of irrigated farms and by 45 percent
of rainfed farms prior to the Masagana 99 Program. The fact that the
rate of adoption increased to 85 percent and 71 percent, respectively,
solely
in 1977 cannot he,attributed to the program but rather should be viewed
as a continuation of the long-run adoption process of the new technology
extended since the late 1960's. In the case of corn, there has been
little dissemination of new varieties developed in the early 1970's
despite the Maisan 77 and Masaganang Maisan programs because the new
technology apperently did not offer higher profitability. Extension
and development of financial markets are indeed important components of
rural development, but the strategy of linking the two has dissipated
the efforts of scarce competent technicians in loan adllnistration
without significantly raising repayment rates in supervised credit
programs.
Concluding Remarks
In summary, interest rate subsidies hav_ not significantly altered
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the unfavorable economic incentives in agriculture caused by government
policies. It is not surprising, therefore, that loanable funds to agri-
culture in real terms have declined despite government instituted credit
quotas and special credit programs. Even higher rates of interest rate
subsidies will be ineffective in offsetting penalties due to pricing
policies because of the fungibility of credit. Additional liquidity
will be allocated to activities where marginal profits or utility are
highest. Relative prices ss well as yields are the major factors
determining rates of return to most enterprises. Cheap credit will not
make an unprofitable activity profitable_
It is also clear that credit subsidies through low interest rates
worsen income distribution because only a few, typically progressive
farmers, receive the cheap credit. When interest rates are not allowed
to reflect cost of financial intermediation, wealth and political power
replace profitability as the basis of allocating credit. On the other
hand, more positive agricultural prices would benefit more low income
farmers.
The choice of credit policies to compensate agriculture for other
adverse policies is due to administrative ease, availability of external
grants and loans_ and to other short-run considerations. While easy to
do, this approach fails to achieve either equity or efficiency objectives.
Cheap credit policies also retard the development of viable formal
financial institutions in rural areas. The objectives of food self-
sufficiency_ increasing exports, and improving income distribution
24
requires long run solutions. This includes correcting price distortions
in real and financial markets and making investments in marketing infra-
structure9 irrigation, research_ and extension. Cheap credit will not
overcome production disincentives caused by low prices and/or low yields.
25
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